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No Quick Fix: Foreign Aid and 
State Performance in Yemen 
SHEILA CARAPICO 
Few of the world's poorest countries better exemplify American interests in government performance than Yemen. Long overshadowed by its oil-
rich Persian Gulf neighbors, Yemen gained attention as both an occasional 
target and a natural haven for militant regional paramilitary groups (includ-
ing but not limited to al Qaeda). Headlines were made at a time when devel-
opment analysts were already worried about ecological and economic stresses 
exacerbated by the strains of structural adjustment and critical water scarcity. 
In view of these circumstances, analysts began wondering if Yemen is an 
example of the combustible mix of poor governance and economic stagna-
tion that could blow up or melt down. Realizing that the stability, safety, and 
welfare of the most populous and poverty-stricken country on the Arabian 
Peninsula matter, the Bush administration promised substantial U.S. assis-
tance for the first time in Yemeni history. The question is, can American aid 
fix Yemen's problems? 
This cautionary tale by an old Yemen-watcher is divided into four parts. 
After reviewing sources of military-political and socioeconomic insecurity 
and prospects for their amelioration, it traces the effects of past international 
aid programs, first at the level of international relations and then at the level 
of infrastructural and institutional development. It describes and analyzes 
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how Soviet and Eastern European security assistance, fat subsidies from Arab 
neighbors during the oil boom, loss of both communist and Gulf aid 
between 1989 and 1991, and statist institution-building efforts by the World 
Bank and Western donors all affected state budgetary allocations, institu-
tional development, and ultimately performance. The caution is that just as 
past bilateral and multilateral assistance ultimately centralized authority in 
executive institutions, an infusion of security assistance may tip the delicate 
balance between the state and civil society; among the executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers; between the military and the civilian arenas; between the 
public and private sectors; or between the political center and the localities. 
My greatest fear is that in an effort to ward off the Somali scenario of chaos 
American policies may bolster the Saddam model of dictatorship. In any 
case, there are no quick fixes to Yemen's national security problem that do 
not address government performance in the areas that matter most to house-
holds. And these too are not easy. 
Security Dilemmas 
Yemen offers a series of enigmas to the outside observer. On the one hand in 
cross-national comparison it lags behind most other countries on virtually 
any development indicator and shares certain disturbing social and ecological 
similarities with famously collapsed states like Somalia and Afghanistan. Yet 
by most narrative accounts Yemen enjoys a kind of political equilibrium, 
some prospects for democratization, and possibilities for economic stabiliza-
tion led by its infant oil industry. Its people hardly resist modernization but, 
to the contrary, are always migrating and trading abroad, improvising roads 
and electricity, clamoring for schools, and demanding progress. 1 In the field 
of international security, although the combined effects of poverty, unruli-
ness, and regime acquiescence left room for small-scale paramilitary groups 
to operate inside the country, the Yemeni government has embraced the 
American war on terrorism, cooperating with U.S. authorities in the pursuit 
of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Having all but ignored this poor, unstable cor-
ner of Arabia in the past, Washington now regards Sana' a as an ally against an 
elusive common enemy. 
Yemen is not a failed state but a new state, a teenager, born only in 1990 
of the marriage of two weak, unstable governments in their twenties: North 
Yemen, or the Yemen Arab Republic, based in Sana'a, where military officers 
deposed the last imam in 1962; and South Yemen, where revolutionaries 
seized power in Aden after the British departure in late 1967 and later 
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declared the People's Democratic Republic. The two Yemens merged in 
1990, only to face off again in a brief conventional civil war in 1994. Having 
reduced Aden's governance institutions to rubble, the victorious Northern 
army overran what had been South Yemen for the first time. Rather than in 
the process of breaking, then, Yemen is a state in the making. National leg-
islative and judicial institutions are not well rooted; the executive branch 
rules in conjunction with the armed forces, manipulating elections and the 
administration of justice to its own advantage.2 Greatly strengthened in the 
past half-decade, the central government's authority still is not uncontested, 
either in the North or in the South. Border agreements with neighboring 
Saudi Arabia and Oman were drawn finally in the 1990s after decades of 
negotiations.3 Basic services and systems of taxation, representation, and law 
enforcement are all under construction. 
Long notorious for its Wild West frontier, where bloodless kidnappings 
and hijackings were commonplace, Yemen became a rather natural haven for 
groups later associated with al Qaeda for several reasons. Its wide-open 
plains, towering mountains, and obscure valleys along a mostly unpatrolled 
1,400-kilometer boundary with Saudi Arabia offered many excellent hide-
outs. Osama bin Laden and several associates have Yemeni roots, especially in 
the distant southeast province of Hadramawt. Like other Middle Eastern 
governments (including those oflsrael, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt), Sana'a had 
encouraged radical Islam as a counterweight to its socialist rivals up until the 
1994 civil war, when veterans and admirers of the much-glamorized anti-
Soviet Afghan jihad joined the North Yemeni army in the sacking of the for-
mer South Yemeni capital of Aden. As elsewhere, the clampdown on leftists 
and Marxists emboldened right-wing fanatics, who attacked socialists, beauty 
parlors, and even ("idolatrous") Islamic shrines in the mid-nineties. More-
over, Yemen had an unusually liberal immigration policy especially for fellow 
Arabs and Muslims. 
So it is not surprising that groups known locally as, variously, Afghan-
Arabs, salafis, Wahhabis, the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, al Qaeda, and other 
general and specific names were able to make homes, conduct military train-
ing, toss the occasional bomb, and spread propaganda inside Yemen. Nor is 
it surprising that Yemeni intelligence was no better able than the FBI, the 
CIA, or the authorities in Hamburg, Germany, to detect the extent of its 
internal al Qaeda network until they all began comparing notes. The Yemeni 
government's initial reaction to the Cole incident was as to another in a series 
of bombings in and around Aden, not as another in a series of attacks on 
Americans. Between October 2000 and September 2001, Sana'a began to 
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uncover connections between a radical fringe within its borders and interna-
tional terrorism. 
Until then, the U.S.-Yemeni relationship remained at arm's length. The 
United States never invested heavily in Yemen, nor have Yemenis seen the 
United States as a benefactor. A few early showpiece projects like the 
Kennedy Water System for Taiz notwithstanding, American generosity was 
pretty paltry. Yemen was twice punished with the suspension of U.S. aid for 
opposition to Israeli or American military actions against fellow Arabs. The 
number, cost, and visibility of U.S. programs pale in comparison to Chinese 
roads, Kuwaiti hospitals, Saudi schools, and World Bank consultants. And 
the American corporate presence, led since the mid-1980s by Hunt Oil of 
Texas, was nothing compared with the massive American business commu-
nity in neighboring Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, hard hit by suspension 
of aid from both Warsaw Pact and Arab Gulf donors, Sana'a has been desper-
ately seeking American approval. Parliamentary elections in 1993, 1997, and 
2003 drew some positive publicity. But for the most part the government of 
President Ali Abdallah Salih failed to convince the United States of its impor-
tance until Americans came under attack in Yemen. Anxious to be treated 
like Pakistan, not Afghanistan, in the wake of September 11, 200 l, the Salih 
administration is keener than ever to curry American favor and to use it to 
domestic political advantage. 
Yemen appeared on Washington's radar screen after internal security, 
always precarious, deteriorated from frontier lawlessness to deadly paramili-
tary operations against Yemeni and international targets.4 Although Somalia-
bound American sailors were targeted in Yemen in the early 1990s, the first 
incident to warrant wide international coverage was the kidnapping of six-
teen Western tourists in the district of Abyan on December 28, 1998-four 
of whom died in a botched rescue mission by the Yemeni government. 
Explosions aboard the USS Cole in Aden harbor in October 2000 and the 
French tanker Limburg in 2002-cosdy especially in terms of inflated insur-
ance premiums for the shipping industry, a potential growth sector for 
investment and revenues-gave the country a reputation as a site of interna-
tional terrorism. 5 Assassinations of three Baptist medical missionaries and a 
prominent Yemeni socialist politician in late 2002 and protests against the 
American invasion of Iraq in early 2003 threatened another sector slated for 
growth, tourism, as the country appeared increasingly dangerous.6 These and 
other signs of a high-risk, low-security environment multiplied disincentives 
to private investors, including resident Yemenis, Yemenis living abroad, and 
foreign companies.7 Security trepidations and constant contestation of land 
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rights hampered further oil, gas, and mineral exploration so essential to sce-
narios for income growth. 
The American and Yemeni militaries have joined forces to patrol Yemen's 
borders and coasts and to share intelligence. After Yemen opposition to the 
Saudi-U.S. alliance against Iraq in the 1990-91 Kuwait War severely strained 
U.S.-Yemeni relations, the Yemeni government took several steps to improve 
its image in Washington. It welcomed the U.S. navy to Aden, implemented 
an unpopular austerity package recommended by the International Monetary 
Fund, mended fences with Saudi Arabia, and began issuing tourist visas to 
Israeli Jews. Evidence of a closer relationship included FBI participation in 
the investigation of the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, Yemeni president Ali 
Abdallah Salih's Washington visit in November 2001, Vice President Dick 
Cheney's trip to Yemen in March 2002, the resumption of military education 
and training, and Yemeni approval of the U.S. Hellfire missile strike on a 
vehicle carrying al Qaeda operatives inside Yemen in November 2002. By 
that time the United States was already providing military assistance in the 
form of training, special forces and security specialists, and materials to sup-
port Sana'a's own counterterrorism campaign. Everyone expects this coopera-
tion to expand in coming years into hundreds of millions of dollars. As in the 
past, therefore, events in the larger world arena-this time the September 
2001 attacks and the occupation of Iraq-are influencing domestic policies 
via government budgets. 
Depending on how you look at it, Yemen is either a fledgling polyarchy or 
an imperfect dictatorship. Among Arab states it is widely considered one of 
the more promising "emerging democracies," in which a relatively laissez-
faire policy betokens some prospects for political as well as economic liberal-
ization. Token female parliamentarians, contested multiparty elections, and 
freewheeling public discourse make it look more enlightened than most of its 
neighbors. All the political parties-including the ruling General People's 
Congress, the conservative, religiously based Reform Party, the Yemeni 
Socialist Party, and the smaller parties-at least pay lip service to electoral 
representation, universal suffrage, human rights, and the rule of law. But 
although democratic practices in parliament, the press, and the courts are 
sometimes vivacious, they are hardly robust. The same clique has ruled from 
Sana' a since the late 1970s. After the civil war the liberal unity constitution 
was amended to reconcentrate power in the central executive and to restrict 
the authority of the elected legislature. The parliamentary elections of April 
2003 served to consolidate the ruling party's strong majority. 
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Still, North-South fissures endure, and the North itself is riven by center-
periphery tensions often cast in tribal idiom. Although the regime resorts to 
more bargaining than brutality in its quest to consolidate control, the mili-
tary already governs. Loyal army, air, republican guard, internal security, and 
now coast guard forces police more effectively than ever. Armed forces moved 
against political paramilitary groups long before the Cole bombing, chasing 
the Abyan-Aden army out of Aden, conducting sweeps in other regions, 
expelling hundreds of non-Yemeni Arabs, and closing some paramilitary 
camps. New laws and death sentences seem to have curbed kidnappings, and 
scores of suspected militants have been rounded up or gunned down. Some 
regions can resist army incursions, but direct military challenges anywhere in 
the country have been crushed. 
Tempting though it is for the United States to concentrate on counterter-
rorism and state-strengthening measures, I fear that a sudden, security-driven 
infusion of resources and expertise into selected security institutions risks 
reinforcing authoritarian tendencies. Surveillance agencies or antiterrorism 
squads can be disproportionately empowered by dollars and elite training. 
This influences the power of the military-security apparatus over civilians 
and also power struggles within the military regime. An important example 
of this has already happened: after the Yemeni army fatally botched an 
attempt to rescue kidnapped Western tourists around Christmas 1998, a new 
special forces unit was established under the command of the president's son 
and successor-designate, Ahmad Ali Abdallah Salih, to deal with quick strikes 
and hostage situations. The U.S. military's efforts to strengthen these special 
forces have fed rumors in Yemen that the Bush administration approves of 
the presidential succession from father to son and favors the special forces 
over other branches of the military and their officers. 
Nor, whatever the immediate exigencies, are the demonstration effects of 
high-powered remote-control executions, like the Hellfire attack, conducive 
to the rule of law. Human rights and due process had already been violated in 
the prosecution of the domestic war against regime opponents in the 1990s, 
though outright extrajudicial killings that could be pinned on the govern-
ment were unusual. The unfortunate precedent is not likely to be offset with 
a few human rights conferences or help with elections administration if the 
net gain in resources engorges a police state. Economic logic can justify an 
investment in stability in order to lure private investors. But if Yemenis per-
ceive a trade-off between utilities and the military, or experience governance 
as more surveillance than responsiveness, this strategy could backfire on both 
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the government and the United States. People expect both security (within 
legal parameters) and a decent standard of living. 
Socioeconomic Insecurities 
Although location gives it a strategic importance that landlocked countries 
in resource-poor environments lack, Yemen's development conundrum 
echoes that of other poorly performing states described in this volume. The 
lack of financial and technical wherewithal to deliver essential services to 
more than 18 million people scattered over a vast terrain perpetuates a 
vicious cycle of poverty. Private investment capital remains scanty, scared, 
and small scale, while the terms of structural adjustment have raised the 
costs of investment and reduced the level of consumption. Civil war, elite 
corruption, and disproportionate spending on domestic security have all 
drained public coffers. All in all, the peculiarities of Yemen's internal and 
external affairs notwithstanding, it is similar to other so-called basket cases, 
desperate for any sort of finance. While national leaders have not managed 
resources well, the economy has also borne the brunt of regional and global 
forces beyond its control. 
By virtually any comparative indicator Yemen now fits the profile of poor 
performance. It scores among the poorest performers in the world on five 
major indicators: civil and political liberties as reported by Freedom House; 
the UN Development Program human development index; negative gross 
domestic product per capita growth during the 1990s; the proportion of the 
population living on less than a dollar a day; and the World Bank's measure 
of rule of law, including things like contract enforcement. The United 
Nations puts Yemen in the group of forty-nine countries that have been iden-
tified by the UN as least developed in terms of their low GDP per capita, 
weak human assets, and high economic and trade vulnerability.8 Life 
expectancy seems to be declining (despite negligible known AIDS cases).9 
With birth rates outstripping economic growth, widening inequality, and 
bad risk ratings-all despite being an oil exporter-prospects for affluence 
seem dim. 
It was not always so. As explained more fully below, in the 1970s and 
1980s foreign aid supplemented by labor remittances enabled urban and 
rural households to acquire electrical power, running water, imported goods, 
and better access to schools and medical attention. On the eve of unification 
the North, with a per capita income of over US$600 a year, was close to "grad-
uating" into the World Bank's middle-income category. Then, due primarily 
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to exogenous factors that suspended both aid and remittances, the economy 
crashed. The poverty rate doubled during the 1990s, while real GDP per 
capita tumbled to about US$300. Once rather rare, malnutrition now 
plagued nearly half of young children, a serious deterioration of nutritional 
standards from a generation earlier, when indigenous grains, vegetables, and 
dairy products were dietary staples. Whereas 1990s' parents had experienced 
great gains in literacy in their school years, their children were crammed into 
crowded, crumbling classrooms. Households that secured water and electric-
ity hookups not long before now found themselves unable to pay for these 
services. New fees made hospitals inaccessible to the burgeoning poor. Cities, 
which had seemed to offer a better life, had become crowded, messy, anomic 
places. High aspirations were dashed, prompting people to take to the streets 
on numerous occas10ns. 
Environmental disaster looms in southwestern Arabia, heretofore a semi-
arid, temperate region of self-sufficient agriculture and herding known his-
torically as Arabia Felix. The calamitous shortage of clean water, water deliv-
ery services, and new water sources to meet mounting urban demand is 
undermining the agricultural economy to such an extent that World Bank 
experts anticipate social conflicts over contesting claims to water. The urban 
centers served by huge public water corporations have drained their hinter-
lands even as the availability of household water delivery is a major incentive 
for rural-to-urban migration. International experts point out that overirriga-
tion and overcultivation of qat, a cocaine-like shrub that is the country's most 
profitable alpine cash crop, grown entirely for the domestic market, is lower-
ing the water table throughout the central highlands. 
Profligate pumping for other crops and purposes in the coastal regions is 
intensifying the salinization of groundwater. These conditions endanger pro-
duction and jeopardize social relations among neighboring villages and 
between cities and rural areas. The water sector is an example: in instituting 
agencies for the central control of ground and surface resources, donors inad-
vertently disrupted intricate local water laws in favor of corruption-prone 
central bureaucracies by assuming the latter's eminent domain rather than 
exploring the question. 10 
Some optimists in the donor community point to economic and political 
liberalization as well as growth in the nascent oil and gas sector. International 
financial analysts have approved of modest steps toward privatization and 
compliance with World Trade Organization standards. Government deficits 
were brought under control. Small declines were posted in fertility, infant 
mortality, and illiteracy. Population growth rates peaked at 3.9 percent and 
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then inched downward. Actual GDP growth, fueled by the petroleum sector, 
fluctuated in the range of 3-8 percent a year from the mid-1990s onward, 
prompting the World Bank to report "recovery" even as the non-oil economy 
remained "sluggish."11 Donors and planners attributed the economic crisis of 
the early 1990s to the triple shock of the 1991 Gulf War, the drought, and 
the 1994 civil war but hoped that strategic, environmental, and oil-price 
conditions would become more auspicious. A great deal depends on petro-
leum revenues, and great hopes are pinned on returning Aden to its former 
glory as a world-class shipping hub-that is, on exogenous variables. 
It is easy to blame political leaders and the ruling class for poor manage-
ment of the economy. 12 Noting that Yemen ranks below most of its neighbors 
in regulatory framework, government effectiveness, rule of law, and its han-
dling of corruption, World Bank experts enumerated problems, including 
poor domestic security, arbitrary regulations, lack of clear property rights and 
other legal uncertainties, high taxes, corruption, smuggling, inefficiencies in 
public service delivery, weak contract enforcement, and an absence of mecha-
nisms for settlement of business disputes. 13 Along with other contemporary 
donors, the World Bank has also criticized Yemen for a bloated public ser-
vice, excessive public management, and bad decisionmaking in such sectors 
as electrical power and water resources management. Yet these criticisms of 
past policies overlook the role of the World Bank and bilateral donors in 
guiding development decisionmaking. 
Erratic Development Finance 
Like many other poor performers, Yemen's macroeconomy is buffeted by 
regional and global geopolitical forces beyond its control. 14 It is not (or not 
simply) that Yemen is the victim of large amorphous forces of globalization, 
nor apart from the colonial era in South Yemen is it a classic case of depen-
dency. Its strategic position in the lower Arabian Peninsula-between the Suez 
Canal, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf-places 
the country along key fault lines in the international system. Via the mecha-
nism of military and economic aid, Yemen felt the impact of the cold war 
and inter-Arab conflicts in every bone of its rather skeletal state structure(s). 
Events like the waxing and waning of Soviet power, the rise and fall of oil for-
tunes in neighboring Arab Gulf states, and the Kuwait War of 1990-91 
directly affected what was spent for what purposes and where. This was not 
bilateral dependence on a single rich patron that deliberately maneuvers 
outcomes but a sort of multilateral pegging of fortunes to a capricious world 
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system. Here we examine two historic periods, before and after unification, 
when events elsewhere directly affected the domestic political economy. 
Boom and Bust in the Two Yemens 
For at least a generation, while communist, Arab, European, and Asian 
donors were feeling generous, Yemen enjoyed significant improvements in 
standards of living. Roads, ports, schools, hospitals, and utilities were 
installed with generous cold war, Arab Gulf, and multilateral aid packages. 
The population per physician dropped from nearly 60,000 to 6,000 in 
North Yemen in the twenty years after 1962. In the postcolonial People's 
Democratic Republic of (South) Yemen (PDRY), where the British had 
established some services and revolutionaries promised better, the population 
served by each doctor fell from nearly 13,000 to about 4,000. 15 The percent-
age of children in school in the North rose from 9 percent to 79 percent dur-
ing this period, a remarkable achievement made possible by a combination of 
local efforts and Saudi-Kuwaiti largesse. 16 In the PDRY, half of all girls 
attended secondary schools, double the rate for colonial Aden, and the num-
ber of mothers losing infant children each year dropped from 197 to 120 per 
thousand live births. North Yemen cut infant mortality too, though female 
secondary school attendance rose only from a very low 3 percent to 12 per-
cent.17 The urban proportion of the PDRY's population swelled from 30 per-
cent to 42 percent, and city dwellers in North Yemen increased from only 
5 percent in the early 1960s to nearly 25 percent by the late eighties. 18 
By 1995 half of all Yemenis had access to safe water and sanitation. 19 Liter-
acy rates were about two-thirds for men and one-quarter for women.20 Many 
of these advances sprang directly from foreign finance and expertise. The 
transportation sector, for instance, was improved by contributions from the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China. South 
Korean companies paid by Saudi Arabia paved the major arteries of the 
North Yemeni road network. The Russians and the World Bank worked on 
port development for Aden and the Northern port of Hodeida. 
Such external largesse was a function of superpower competition and the 
extraordinary riches of nearby oil-exporting states. Postcolonial South Yemen 
was backed financially by communist governments, Arab neighbors, and 
even the World Bank. Between 1968 and 1980, the USSR disbursed over 
US$150 million to the PDRY, or about a third of its total aid receipts for the 
period; it was spent for irrigation works, a thermal power station, a joint fish-
ing enterprise, port facilities, public health, and oil exploration.21 Hundreds 
of millions more went to arms, which were exported on easy long-term 
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credit. China provided about US$84 million, especially for road construc-
tion, a textile factory, and agricultural development. East German experts 
trained police and security forces. 22 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hun-
gary, and Poland also sent commodity credits and technical experts. Hun-
dreds of Socialist Party members studied in Eastern Europe. The state social-
ist model was clearly preferred, and it showed in public investments. 
Aden was not entirely dependent on communist resources and models, 
however. Perhaps surprising in light of its socialist aspirations, the World 
Bank's International Development Association (IDA) provided about a third 
of the PDRY's development loans in the 1970s and more in the 1980s. Offi.-
cial grants from Kuwait and other Arab countries had reached US$125 mil-
lion in 1982, and total transfers from OPEC countries from 1973 through 
1981 were estimated at US$399 million. 23 Although the Soviet Union and 
China were extending about half of all new development loans, Arab sources 
(directly or indirectly through multilateral organizations) generated most of 
the remainder.24 By the late 1980s loans and grants from Arab sources far sur-
passed ruble transfers. Overall, South Yemen gradually moved from depen-
dence on communist states to dependence on Arab and multilateral sources. 
Still, the demise of European communist states left Aden bereft. In the end 
(following an intraparty bloodbath in 1986), the state ceased to exist. 
The picture in the aspiring capitalist North was not as different from the 
socialist South as one might expect. During the cold war, North Yemen's for-
tunes too were enhanced by global and regional power politics. The USSR, 
China, and the United States vied for influence via large infrastructural proj-
ects in the 1960s, when few other countries were getting aid from all three 
superpowers. Subsequently, the World Bank, the United Nations, West Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Japan became active donors. The United States 
(which branded the PDRY a terrorist state) had only a small U.S. Agency for 
International Development mission in Sana' a, which was suspended between 
1967 and 1972 on account of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its Yemen policy 
was always tempered by American deference to Saudi interests. 25 Between 
1973 and 1982, gifts, grants, and loans from Arab oil exporters outstripped 
all other sources, although as the main supplier of weaponry, the Soviet 
Union was also Sana'a's principal creditor, holding nearly half of outstanding 
debt in 1986.26 Hundreds of North Yemenis, civilians as well as officers, also 
studied in communist Eastern Europe (as they did in Western Europe and 
North America, though Yemen was very marginal to the United States, in 
economic terms, especially compared to Saudi Arabia). 
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The Saudi kingdom exercised considerable influence over its southern 
neighbor by providing weapons, petroleum supplies, direct-grant budgetary 
subsidies, turnkey construction projects, salaries for teachers recruited else-
where in the Arab world, covert payments to individuals and factions, and 
easy access to work permits for Yemenis. 27 Estimates of total annual Saudi 
payments range between about US$400 million and US$1 billion during 
the oil boom, when Iraq, Kuwait, and other Arab OPEC (Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) donors also helped keep Sana' a afloat finan-
cially. For a while Iraq was the largest financier of government projects. 
OPEC sources provided some US$1.4 billion between 1973 and 1981 
(almost all financial rather than technical assistance).28 OPEC assistance lev-
eled off after 1981. Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states funded 
North Yemen heavily because of its poverty and proximity and as part of 
their regional anticommunist strategy. So in the cold war standoff between 
Sana'a and Aden, Saudi Arabia represented Western interests by backing the 
North. Washington recognized a Saudi sphere of influence in Yemen most 
visibly when, during an inter-Yemeni border skirmish in 1979, "the United 
States cooperated with Saudi Arabia to greatly expand the security assistance 
program to the Yemen Arab Republic by providing F-5 aircraft, tanks, vehi-
cles, and training. "29 
Before unification, then, both Yemeni republics dealt with a mixed bag of 
benefactors. The American role was negligible. Moscow held nearly half of 
both governments' debts, mostly for military equipment, a major factor in 
their budgets. China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria 
accounted for another fifth of Aden's outstanding debt and a fraction of the 
North's. Japan and Western Europe lent funds for projects in the North but 
not the South. The World Bank and Arab Gulf states favored Sana'a over the 
PDRY, but supplied credits to both.30 In short, both Yemens depended on 
international aid rather than any special patron. Although a good deal has 
been written about dependence on a single bilateral donor, often the United 
States, this situation has been less investigated and may be characteristic of 
other poorly performing states. But Yemen had then and has now rather 
more strategic salience than many other poor countries. 
External Shocks to a Unified Yemen 
Unification in 1990 was a product of domestic politics intersecting with a 
seismic global shift and clear economic incentives. Yemeni unity roughly 
coincided with the demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the cold 
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war, and the Berlin Wall and just preceded German unification. Negotiations 
between Sana'a and Aden, intermittent for over two decades, now offered 
each regime a means of survival.31 Economic logic also played a role. Texans 
and Russians prospecting on their respective sides of the inter-Yemeni fron-
tier discovered common oil deposits in the 1980s. Soon the two nascent state 
petroleum companies merged into a Yemeni oil investment corporation. For 
all intents and purposes, state socialism and state capitalism had converged. 
Cost-benefit analysis favored joint ventures in electrical power, mutual road 
connections, and countrywide adventure tourism, antiquities tourism, com-
mercial fishing, export agriculture, and certain manufactures. There was 
some hope that the law and order mentality of the PDRY would have a set-
tling effect on the rampant petty entrepreneurship of the North. Initially, 
then, the plan was that oil, economies of scale, and redevelopment of Aden as 
a free port could offset dwindling external public assistance. It might have 
worked but for a number of setbacks. 
The discovery of commercially viable oil deposits in 1984 had signaled 
new-found possibilities to attract international direct investment. Even in the 
heyday of British Aden, when the port was a major naval hub between the 
Suez Canal and India, few foreign investors were ever attracted to Yemen. A 
British Petroleum (BP) refinery was Yemen's only significant commercial ven-
ture even in the colonial era, and no large private investments in any sector 
survived anywhere in Yemen in the tumultuous 1970s. In 1984, when the 
Dallas-based Hunt Oil Company found commercially viable petroleum 
deposits near Marib in southeastern North Yemen, prospects for attracting 
foreign private investment improved for the first time since 1962. Vice Presi-
dent George Bush attended Hunt's going-on-line celebrations in 1986, 
underscoring American interest in Yemen's petroleum sector. Soon Exxon, 
and then a consortium of South Korean firms, bought into Yemen-Hunt; 
Texaco, Elf Aquitaine, Total, Canadian Occidental, and USSR firms negoti-
ated to drill for Yemeni oil. The Soviet company Technoexport made a major 
find in 1986 at Shabwa across the border from Marib. 
The oil sector generated subcontracting opportunities for suppliers and 
builders such as the U.S. firm that built a small modular refinery near Marib 
and a Lebanese-Italian-German group that laid the pipeline. There were new 
commercial finds in 1987, 1988, and 1989, mostly south of the inter-Yemeni 
border, including the major Hadramawt concession that went to Canadian 
Occidental.32 Soon there were discussions of refurbishing the old BP refinery 
at Aden and of exporting via a revitalized Aden port. Given discoveries under 
their common border and the increasingly clear advantages of cooperation,33 
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the two Yemeni public petroleum companies merged their operations into 
the joint Yemen Company for Investment in Oil and Mineral Resources. 
This company signed a production agreement in late 1989 with an interna-
tional consortium consisting of Hunt and Exxon, the Kuwait Foreign Petro-
leum Exploration Corporation, Total, and two Technoexport subsidiaries. 
Aspirations for growth led by oil and shipping were dashed within a couple 
of months after unification by the fighting in the Gulf in 1990-91, however. 
By mere luck of the draw, newly unified Yemen held both the "Arab seat" and 
the rotating chair of the Security Council when the U.S.-backed resolution 
authorizing force to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait came up for a vote. When 
Yemen voted no, Secretary of State James Baker admonished it for what he 
called an expensive mistake. And indeed it was, for Saudi Arabia and the 
other Gulf monarchies reacted angrily. Ultimately the war disrupted the pri-
vate remittances and international public finance that heretofore kept all of 
Yemen afloat.34 In the clash among its most generous Arab benefactors, Yemen 
lost hundreds of millions of dollars from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf 
Cooperation Council monarchies, and republican Iraq, not to mention the 
token US$30 million a year or so from the United States. Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia suspended work visas for most Yemenis, sending some 750,000 to 
800,000 people (male workers or traders and some families) over the border.35 
A hefty one-time infusion of migrants' savings notwithstanding, the com-
bined loss of public (aid) and private (remittance) access to hard currency 
sent the domestic economy into a tailspin.36 Urban services, most conspicu-
ously in the Red Sea port city of Hodeida, were overwhelmed by the influx of 
returnees. Exacerbated by drought and the financial costs of relocating offi-
cials from Aden to Sana'a, by 1993, despite modest oil sector growth, real per 
capita income was 10 percent lower than in 1989. Unemployment was more 
than 25 percent, and the inflation rate hit 50 percent. Public sector employ-
ees went unpaid for months. The current account deficit for 1990-93 topped 
US$3 billion. Central Bank reserves plummeted to the equivalent of a 
month's import bills. The debt overhang, measured by the ratio of debt to 
GDP, barely noticeable a few years earlier, was 200 percent, among the high-
est in the world. Now the International Monetary Fund was recommending 
stringent adjustment measures.37 
Declining aid receipts, the concomitant free fall in hard currency reserves, 
and depressed oil prices forced the riyal downward in the early 1990s, exacer-
bating the zero-sum reasoning that led to the civil war of 1994.38 Neighbor-
ing Gulf monarchies rewarded the Southern socialists' separatist aspirations 
with covert payments.39 In the end, Sana'a's army encircled the rebels in Aden 
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and disabled the city's main water supply. With some help from irregular 
"volunteers," the army plundered the city's public infrastructure, systemati-
cally destroying the files of the former PDRY ministries of planning, hous-
ing, justice, social security, labor, and security. It also looted foreign con-
sulates, UN agency compounds, the Red Cross, oil company offices, hotels, 
museums, prisons, factories, port warehouses, and selected private homes.40 
Later the central banks, the national airlines, and other public companies 
were merged and the pace of privatization of PDRY enterprises accelerated. 
Note the destruction of institutions and services as the physical manifestation 
of the old PDRY state. 
Victorious over the socialists, Sana' a begged for hundreds of million of 
dollars to reconstruct what had been destroyed. Talks with the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund focused on reducing a cumulative 
combined public debt of between US$8 billion and US$10 billion, especially 
the Russian portion of the debt. And indeed receipts surged from a little over 
US$200 million in 1995 to more than twice that amount the following year. 
Virtually the entire increase came from the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), in conjunc-
tion with the Economic, Financial, and Administrative Reform Program 
(EFARP). Now multilateral assistance, including Arab and European Union 
funds and especially the IDA, accounted for over three-quarters of external 
financing. The IMF's contribution soared from near zero to nearly 30 percent. 
Whereas past loans and grants covered projects, usually involving physical 
construction, the EFARP focused on programs leading to debt reduction.41 
While donors, led by the World Bank, the Netherlands, and Germany, 
expressed faith in development cooperation, new aid was hardly on the gen-
erous terms of an earlier era.42 As poverty, inflation, and unemployment sky-
rocketed, households, social services, and enterprises faced their own deficits. 
Spending on education slipped from 19 percent to 16 percent of the govern-
ment budget.43 The burden fell disproportionately on the unemployed, land-
less peasants, and female-headed households.44 
Petroleum, the economy's potential savior, generated much-needed but 
unreliable revenues. By the mid-1990s oil earnings of about US$300 million 
a year covered around half of a leaner, meaner state budget. This was 
nowhere near enough to halt Yemen's fall into the ranks of the world's poor-
est countries nor to reduce the government's need for foreign grants and 
loans to cover its expenses. Although as a small, non-OPEC exporter Yemen 
had no control over them, world prices increasingly drove government 
accounts, the balance of trade, and national income. Other sectors were still 
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ignored by large multinational corporations and were barely attractive to 
Yemenis living abroad. Therefore, a policy favoring privatization and foreign 
investment notwithstanding, the state's share of the economic pie was actu-
ally expanding because oil rents replaced migrants' remittances as the main 
source of earned foreign exchange.4' Aid per capita slipped from US$22 to 
US$ l 5 between 1997 and 2000, rising again following the reinstatement of a 
U.S. economic aid package worth about US$56 million in 2000. Debt ser-
vice increased from 2.6 percent to 3.2 percent of the value of exports in the 
same three years. 46 Domestic tax collection remained moribund. Rises in 
world prices for oil in 2000-03, combined with a slight increase in rates of 
production, boosted gross national income, per capita gross domestic prod-
uct, and earnings from exports. With no significant nonfuel exports, how-
ever, a steep rise in oil prices would sustain economic growth. 
Public Sector Growth 
Foreign aid affected not only the economy as a whole but also budgetary and 
policy decisions that determined the distribution of resources in society. This 
section explains the decisive impact of international development assistance 
in a country without the wherewithal to create basic socioeconomic infra-
structure. When state construction projects began in the 1970s there was a 
colonial legacy in Aden but not, really, in the rest of South Yemen; the 
Northern imam heretofore maintained only the most minimal civil service 
and public works. Bilateral and multilateral assistance enabled both fledgling 
governments, but especially the North, to build institutions as well as infra-
structure. This is how the state structures grew-one aid project at a time-
and it is how public sectors came to dominate both Yemeni economies. East 
German training of domestic security forces, Soviet credits for arms pur-
chases, World Bank loans to public corporations, billions of dollars spent on 
a nationwide power grid, Saudi funds for conservative education, and too 
many uncoordinated projects in the water sector all left a direct imprint on 
an inchoate bureaucratic structure. Thus when the World Bank and other 
donors criticize centralization and the large state share in the economy, they 
are implicitly repudiating at least some of their own past institution-building 
efforts. I demonstrate this point with respect to the power and water sectors 
in North Yemen (both sectors being essential to meeting basic human needs, 
to stimulating economic development, and to affording citizen appraisals of 
government performance), in which substantial international investments 
have only partly solved some problems while creating others. 
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Let us focus on North Yemen, the larger and surviving partner, embarking 
on state construction from scratch with a capitalist model in mind. Quite 
simply, the state sector, including its bureaucracy and its public corporations, 
came to resemble what one expatriate called "the sum of past aid projects." In 
national plans recommended by donors to rationalize investments, foreign 
public sector loans and grants were expected to cover the lion's share of new 
investment and a very high proportion of spending in such sectors as educa-
tion, power, water, and even manufacturing. Indeed, with North Yemen's 
acute shortages of technical expertise, anticommunist bent, empty public 
coffers, and perennial instability, only the influx of international assistance 
can explain the engorgement of the state sector. How else could a coup-
ridden government with negligible domestic revenues amass such a relatively 
large centralized public sector so quickly? Consider the period between the 
late 1960s and the early 1980s when North Yemen experienced the improve-
ments in standards of living cited above and the institution building 
explained below, along with a civil war, a military coup, two subsequent pres-
idential assassinations, domestic insurrection, Saudi antipathy, and skir-
mishes with South Yemen. 
Ir may at first seem incongruous that five-year plans, normally thought of 
as a socialist mechanism, were introduced into North Yemen by "bastions of 
neoliberal orthodoxy" like the World Bank. The Bank's very first order of 
business was the establishment of a North Yemen Central Planning Organi-
zation to compile a national three-year plan.47 In the process, the Bank, the 
UN Development Program (UNDP), and the Kuwait Fund collaborated to 
enlarge the Central Planning Organization to manage hundreds of externally 
funded projects. The UNDP, the IDA, the Kuwait Fund, and West Germany 
provided technical experts to ghostwrite the ambitious five-year plan, 
1976-81, beautifully published in a 924-page hard-bound English version 
that devoted an entire subchapter to listing needs for foreign experts. 48 In this 
plan, foreign loans and grants were to cover roughly half of all investments; at 
least three-quarters of government investments; and nearly all new projects in 
power, water, education, health, and other civilian sectors. 49 It was an ambi-
tious program that would create massive bureaucracies to manage centralized 
universal public services. 
In the electrical power sector, the World Bank took the lead in replacing 
the jumble of private, cooperative, and municipal generators-which had 
begun to light most towns and some villages in the evenings-with a nation-
wide power grid.50 Since electricity consumption surged steeply (from near 
zero) during the affluent 1970s, and in consideration of technical snafus that 
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plagued early municipal suppliers, a nationwide megaproject was recom-
mended. Under a series of multimillion-dollar loans, steam turbine engines 
were installed in the Red Sea near the port city of Hodeida and a network of 
high-tension transformers to supply hundreds of thousands of homes and 
businesses in the northern half of North Yemen. In 1988 the Arab Fund 
approved a second grid to serve the Taiz region of the Yemen Arab Republic 
and Aden in the South, where the aging Soviet-built thermal plant needed 
refurbishment. 
Huge investments in centralization notwithstanding, the grid never oper-
ated very well. By the mid-l 990s the Yemen General Electric Company 
(YGEC) was wired to only a third of households, and power outages forced 
businesses and hospitals to maintain backup generators. In retrospect, using 
sea-powered generators in a country soon discovered to be endowed with oil, 
liquid natural gas, and solar potential seemed shortsighted. 11 Power stations 
on both sides were damaged on the first day of the 1994 civil war. The 
North-South network recommended in the 1980s was completed in 1997, 
with funding primarily from the Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Social and 
Economic Development. 52 As creditors, the Paris Club urged the YGEC to 
phase out subsidies, sell shares to the private sector, and break up the national 
monopoly; other consultants drew up a master plan for electricity and gas 
calling for more loans and contracts to enable the YGEC to alleviate sched-
uled rolling blackouts and unscheduled brownouts. 53 
All of this was very political. North Yemen's nationwide grid was part of 
the centralization of heretofore local services into a public corporation. The 
Aden-Taiz link was a step toward unity. Blowing out power stations was later 
a tactic of war. Blackouts and brownouts in the vanquished South caused 
such bitterness that the Netherlands embassy took the lead in upgrading the 
system in the far southeastern Hadramawt region to assuage political tensions 
there. Power failures are still not uncommon in the urban centers, and many 
communities remain off the "national" grid. Not surprisingly, those same 
communities are wont to resent government interference in local affairs. 
Erratic electricity supplies discourage investors and technology users while 
reminding everybody that the government is not working properly. 
The water sector was a different story. Whereas electricity is widely con-
sidered a natural monopoly, the water sector in a semiarid, mountainous 
country is naturally decentralized. Yemen's traditional water resource man-
agement mechanisms-canals, cisterns, shallow wells, spate systems, and 
other devices tailored to each microenvironment-were ecologically elegant, 
separating every drop of water by use: drinking, cooking, livestock, bathing, 
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irrigation. Private and community water rights, with minute provisions for 
drinking and irrigation, were a central feature of both Islamic and tribal law: 
water management was a crucial part of the agrarian order. But household 
supplies fell unhealthfully short of World Health Organization standards. 
New pumping and drilling technology introduced in the 1970s revolution-
ized water utilization. Even collectively, international developers can hardly 
be blamed for all the profligate pumping that now threatens long-standing 
aquifers, since municipalities and farmers were often wasteful. Still, a range 
of donor agencies contributed to the strange, ultimately counterproductive 
development of water management bureaucracies. And when the concept of 
eminent domain applied by foreign donors to water resources enabled 
national agencies to pump farm water to the cities, this wreaked havoc with a 
critical feature of indigenous Islamic or tribal law. 
Water engineers were quick to recognize both the peril of overpumping 
and the disfunctionality of the hydraheaded water bureaucracy assembled 
through "institution-building" projects. 54 The National Water and Sewerage 
Authority (NWASA) was established in 1973 at the urging of lenders to 
assume oversight of huge urban delivery systems under construction in 
Sana'a, Taiz, and Hodeida. Later, NWASA expanded, was moved from one 
ministry to another, and then became a semiautonomous public corporation, 
like the electricity company, with a large well-paid professional staff in a huge 
central office. 55 
The management of the rural water supply-for three-quarters of the 
population spread out over mountainous, semiarid terrain-was another 
matter. As each of eight or ten donor agencies introduced its own unique 
technology, management systems, and accounting methods to a different 
selected counterpart bureaucracy established and trained for this purpose, 
units and outposts of the Rural Water Supply Department proliferated. More 
water agencies were initiated by other international development agencies in 
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Civil Aviation Authority, the federation of 
development cooperatives, the Central Planning Organization, and the Min-
istry of Oil and Mineral Resources' Geological Survey Division (the latter an 
American Trojan horse). By the mid-1980s, at the urging of the UNDP, a 
cabinet-level Supreme Water Council began requiring private drillers to 
obtain signatures from each of several water commissioners. On one level the 
state was asserting its ownership of natural water (and mineral) reserves; on 
another, a new state class enjoyed unprecedented opportunities for private 
enrichment. Both levels encouraged heavy water usage. 
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Another way in which international development agencies facilitated over-
exploitation of water resources was by constructing large-scale, capital-inten-
sive Ministry of Agriculture irrigation schemes intended to stimulate cultiva-
tion of semitropical crops like citrus fruits in an otherwise semiarid climate. 56 
Cheap credits for private irrigation and import policies discouraging produc-
tion of indigenous drought-tolerant cereals in favor of exotic fruits and vegeta-
bles for export also contributed to heavy water utilization. While Yemeni poli-
cymakers, corrupt bureaucrats, wildcat entrepreneurs, and ordinary farmers 
smitten with a new technology made enough of a mess on their own, interna-
tional experts recommended and funded some terrible policy decisions. 
By 1995 annual freshwater withdrawal was estimated at a phenomenal 
136 percent of total water resources, second in the world only to neighboring 
Saudi Arabia. 57 Yet half of Yemeni households had no access to safe water, 
and the per capita water supply was among the most meager in the world. In 
1997 IDA, UNDP, and the Netherlands formed the Multi-Donor Group for 
Yemen Water to study and help alleviate a perilous water shortage. One rec-
ommendation-no longer ecologically or institutionally practical, though 
repeated in a number of reports-was a return to local, indigenous water 
management. 58 It was certainly too late for Taiz, where the Kennedy Water 
System (built by USAID and improved by the World Bank and other fun-
ders) drew from wells in a verdant valley to supply a city whose population 
grew tenfold in less than two decades. The verdant farms are gone, and yet 
neighborhoods in Taiz go thirsty or buy water retail. This project and others 
based on the principle of eminent domain for public works-such as roads 
and oil fields-also had unforeseen consequences for the practice of religious 
and common law in the Taiz region and elsewhere. Always contested but sub-
ject to a substantial body of Quranic law and communal tradition, water 
rights were an inherently local matter of inestimable value. The nationaliza-
tion of water rights for urban use, however rational or justified in terms of 
public policy, undermined important legal practice and rights without 
replacing them with an alternative legal structure. The impiicit trade-off was 
a promise of urbanlike services including a different sort of "right" to utili-
ties. But villagers saw a net drain of resources to the urban centers, resources 
of which water is the most vital. 
Similar effects were to be found in other important sectors. Foreign aid 
enabled the Ministry of Education to centralize and nationalize schools, 
while Gulf funding of primary, secondary, and higher education helped shape 
the curriculum at all levels. Saudi aid for education was especially capricious, 
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first assisting the ministry and Sana' a University but later aimed at private 
parochial schools and colleges. Both the health and education ministries 
became sprawling central bureaucracies. One development expert called the 
Ministry of Agriculture "a clearing house for foreign aid." Thanks to access to 
transnational credits and tenders, the Ministry of Public Works owned what 
was for a time the largest company in the country. "Capitalist" and "commu-
nist" donors alike funded agricultural projects and industrialization until the 
state had become the principal source of new investments in both sectors. 
Overall-indeed, rather surprisingly-the state's share of large enterprises in 
the "capitalist" North was not much less than in the PDRY (although petty 
trade flourished in the former and languished in the South).59 
The emergence of a technocratic elite within the executive branch of gov-
ernment to manage what became the Ministry of Planning, the water and 
power corporations, ministries of public works and education, and other 
important central institutions was directly connected to study-abroad possi-
bilities. A political leadership otherwise composed of semiliterate officer-
tribesmen had not envisioned national development plans, nationwide power 
grids, or curricula. These were planned, funded, and executed by donors and 
staffed by a new class of foreign-educated technocrats. The World Bank, con-
sistently the leading financier and policy adviser, designed and financed some 
of the very same public corporations its economists wished to see privatized, 
decentralized, and streamlined. Overall, then, the cumulative effects of the 
institution-building efforts of a dizzying array of donors was the accumula-
tion of public sector entities controlled by the central executive. Unlike oil 
rents that enter the general coffers of the kleptocracy, or for that matter 
migrants' remittances that used to evade bureaucratic siphoning, aid pro-
grams channel resources to particular institutions and individuals whose 
political and economic fortunes are thereby greatly enriched. Substantial 
investments naturally affected the distribution of values in a resource-poor 
environment. 
Conclusions 
Clearly Yemen faces many obstacles to security and prosperity. It is a new 
state with a long-entrenched regime but incomplete sovereignty. It has not all 
that much oil and even less water. Popular aspirations have been repeatedly 
elevated and dashed, and millions of teenagers face an uncertain future. Reg-
ular elections have not produced regime change but only reinforced the 
monopoly of the ruling General People's Congress. Even without detailing 
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how Sana'a and Riyadh encouraged the Islamist right as a counterweight to 
the socialist left, fed subsidies to key tribal militia, or subverted law and 
order, and even assuming optimal political will on the part of the Salih 
administration, it is easy to see that improving governance and government 
performance would be a tall order. Providing universal access to electrical 
power and water alone is still a daunting yet indispensable task, essential to 
meeting basic human and entrepreneurial needs; the inability to deliver 
power and water even with significant sustained international investment 
represents a fundamental kind of state malfunction. 
This chapter makes four main points. First, the United States can no 
longer afford to ignore problems of law and order in southwestern Arabia 
because they impinge on Red Sea shipping and the stability of the entire 
peninsula. While in the short run Yemen is unlikely to either blow up or melt 
down, its relative tranquility is fragile and unfinished. Second, deteriorating 
utilities and inadequate services matter not because misery and frustration 
necessarily breed terrorism but because infrastructure represents the physical 
and social girding of the state apparatus and the main criteria by which ordi-
nary men and women assess government performance. Third, Yemeni states' 
ability to offer citizens basic services in exchange for governance has hung on 
decisions of external donors in light of capricious global and regional circum-
stances-in a boom-bust cycle. Finally, bilateral and multilateral donor pro-
grams have always been statist by definition, greatly expanding the power, 
wealth, and bureaucracy of the central executive and, in many sectors, con-
tributing to unwieldy, ineffective public agencies and corporations. Thus 
external donors, led by the World Bank, must share responsibility for creat-
ing an institutional structure that is both too big and not big enough. 
It is still not clear whether the current consortium of the United States, 
the World Bank, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, other European coun-
tries, the European Union as such, UN agencies, and presumably soon some 
Arab OPEC governments can or will help lift Yemen out of the ranks of the 
world's poorest and poorest performing countries. Perhaps a unified condo-
minium of donors is an improvement over the past multiplicity of competing 
models from the point of view of rational policymaking. On the other hand, 
pressures from international creditors to raise prices for basic commodities 
and services have been greeted with street demonstrations and other forms of 
protest. Other Arab, African, and Asian governments have learned that pros-
ecution of economic austerity measures and a simultaneous security crack-
down risk kindling popular support for right-wing causes. Outside of wide-
spread opposition to American policies regarding Israel and Iraq, Yemen is by 
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no means a hotbed of anti-American or anti-Western sentiment (I detected 
outrage at the murder of the Baptists but not over the Hellfire assassination; 
and Islamists in the Reform Party angry over the 2003 elections' ballot count 
complained to American and European delegations). Such sentiments may 
be stoked if Washington and the West are seen as conspiring with an extrac-
tive national security state responding to external powers, as for instance 
when FBI operatives were reportedly "crawling all over Aden" in the Cole 
investigation as Yemeni forces were conducting dubious mass arrests. 
This conclusion offers no specific policy recommendations. If anyone 
knew how to fix Yemen's water and electricity problems, they would have 
done it in California by now. Guns and cowboy-tribesmen are not necessarily 
more of a problem in rural Yemen than in Wisconsin. Primary schools and 
teacher education are surely needed, but we know from Egypt that mass edu-
cation does not automatically boost economic performance. Having seen so 
many projects that seemed reasonable on technical grounds at the time of 
implementation result in deleterious long-term consequences, I am not urg-
ing more, less, or even different American programs in Yemen but only ask-
ing donors and experts to be aware of the political and policy implications of 
institution-building programs. 
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